Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 18 | Number 4

Article 3

1-1-1996

Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a
Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious
Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for
Conduct Ocurring over the Internet
Ian C. Ballon

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability
for Conduct Ocurring over the Internet, 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 729 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol18/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace:
Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing
Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and
Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring
Over the Internetf
by
IAN

C. BALLON*

Table of Contents
I. Vicarious Liability as an Outgrowth of the Natural Law
of C yberspace ............................................................................
II. Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Liability
in C yberspace ...........................................................................
A. Copyright Protection and Infringement .........................
B. Fair Use and Time in Cyberspace ....................................
C. The Liability of Online Service Providers ......................
D. The Internet is Not a Dance Hall or Flea Market ........
III. Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Trademark
Liability in Cyberspace ............................................................
A. Online Trademark Infringement ......................................
B. Indirect Trademark Liability ............................................
IV . Tort Liability in Cyberspace ...................................................
A. Online Services Treated Like a Book Store,
Newsstand, or Television Network ..................................
B. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, Inc .....................
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ............................
V. Defining New Rules in Cyberspace ........................................

t

733
736
736
737
740
748
750
751
752
754
754
757
759
761

© 1996 Ian C. Ballon

* Ian C. Ballon is of counsel to Brown & Bain in Palo Alto, California and concentrates
on intellectual property and Internet-related litigation and strategic counseling. Mr. Ballon is the
author of the forthcoming legal treatise THE LAW OF THE INTERNET, from which this article is
adapted in part. Mr. Ballon's e-mail address is iballoOO@counsel.com.

730

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[Vol. 18:729

VI. Vicarious Liability as an Impediment to the
International Development of the Internet ..........................
V II. Conclusion .................................................................................
VIII. Post-script: The Netcom Settlement .......................................

764
766
766

1996]

PINNING THE BLAME IN CYB3ERSPACE

Introduction
Vicarious liability, or the principle that under certain
circumstances it is fair and just to hold unrelated third parties liable
for conduct which they did not initiate or perhaps even condone, is
both a logical outgrowth of, and an impediment to, the rapid
development of the Internet as an international information
superhighway.' Although the Internet-the world's largest computer
network, connecting other computer networks and users-developed
from a system first installed at U.C.L.A. in 1969,2 it was only in the
mid-1990s that Internet access increased exponentially for business

and home users. As more powerful home computers allowed for the
development of more complex retail software, the Internet, once the
domain of university and U.S. government research facilities, became
accessible to home users for a modest fee often lower than that for

basic telephone or cable service. The Internet, as a cooperative
venture not owned by any single entity or government, allows people,

from the safety and relative anonymity of their home or office
computers, to interact with others by private E-mail or through more
public newsgroups, bulletin boards, or "Listservs." As of January 1996,
the Emerging Technologies Research Group estimated that Internet
users spent an average of 6.6 hours per week on the Internet,
representing time previously spent watching television, listening to the
1. The term "information superhighway" was popularized by Vice President Al Gore
during the 1992 presidential campaign to describe a vision of a communications network akin to
the Internet. Ian C. Ballon, Litigating in Cyberspace, in 2 THE PERFORMING ART OF ADVOCACY:
CREATING A NEW SPIRIT § 18 (A.B.A. 1995). Since President Clinton's appointment of the
Information Infrastructure Task Force, and its Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights (entitled "Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure"),
issued on Sept. 5, 1995 (the "NII White Paper"), the term "information superhighway" has been
transmuted to "national information infrastructure." International boundaries dissolve over
the Internet, however, making reference to a "national" information superhighway or
infrastructure seem parochial, or even shortsighted.
2. The Internet developed from a project conceived in 1966 by Bob Taylor, the director of
the computer research program at the U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA) to link computers together so that research facilities could pool their resources.
The first node of what initially became known as "Arpanet" was installed at UCLA in 1969.
Cisler, The Creators, WIRED, Dec. 1994, at 153. Today, the Internet connects over four million
individual "servers," or host computers, around the world. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright
Liability of Bulletin Board Operatorsfor Infringement by Subscribers, 1 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 6
(1995). "Each server is linked to and accessible from any other point on the Internet over a
matrix of more than 40,000 interconnected networks. By means of standard protocols and
application-specific client-server software such as FTP, Gopher, the World Wide Web, Usenet
News and Internet Relay Chat, Internet servers provide to over 30,000,000 Internet users many
of the same services offered by more traditional dial-up bulletin board services .... Id.
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radio, or making long distance telephone calls.3 As could be expected
from any public gathering of over four million individuals, those who
"surf the 'net," or interact online, represent a wide spectrum of the
population,

including, unfortunately, copyright and trademark

infringers and intentional tortfeasors.
While the demographics of Cyberspace 4 may not be materially

different from those of the population at large-except that the online
world today is disproportionately well-educated, male and affluent
compared to the country as a whole--the nature of the way people
interact in the virtual community that is Cyberspace differs in certain
fundamental respects from the way people interact in "the real world"
(or, perhaps more accurately stated, on terra firma, since Cyberspace
increasingly is part of the "real world" even if its boundaries and
dimensions are ethereal). These differences have not been fully
appreciated by policymakers and commentators who argue, based

primarily on case law that has little application to Cyberspace, that
online providers can be held strictly liable for conduct which they
neither condoned nor even knew about.
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of vicarious or indirect

liability in online stems from the misapplication of case law developed
on terra firma to the world of Cyberspace. While the increasing
volume of litigation over third party liability for online conduct is a
natural byproduct of the unique characteristics of the Internet, it also
3. EDUPAGE, Jan. 14, 1996 (citing TAMPA TRiu., Jan. 12, 1996, at B & Fl)
<http://www.educom.edu/web/edupage.html>.
4. "Cyberspace" is a term coined by William Gibson in a mid-1980s novel. WILLIAM
GIasoN, NEUROMANCER 55 (1986). Gibson wrote about a "'virtual' reality generated by computers
in which people could interact, conduct business, and entertain themselves." Flex H. Kent & L.
Hertz, Establishing a Foothold in Cyberspace, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 21, 1995, at 3. What Gibson
prophesied in his science fiction novel has, less than ten years later, become a reality.
5. Because of the decentralized organization of the Internet, it is difficult to obtain
accurate estimates of the number of users. According to one court, about 25 million individuals
had some form of Internet access as of mid-1994, and at that time the audience was estimated to
be doubling each year. MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). A
different survey in September, 1995 concluded that there were only 5.8 million individual
Internet users in the United States (in addition to about 3.9 million subscribers to commercial
online services), 67% of whom were male and more than half between the ages of 18 and 34.
EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Sept. 28, 1995 (citing INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Sept. 28, 1995). Neilson
Media Research estimated that in the fall of 1995, 37 million people in the U.S. and Canada had
access to the Internet (or about 16.6% of the adult populations of both countries). EDUPAGE,
supra note 3, Oct. 31, 1995. At the end of 1995, Insight New Media estimated that there were 27
million Internet users in North America, almost half of whom had undergraduate degrees and
20% of whom had graduate degrees. EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Dec. 17, 1995 (citing INTERNET
FACTS 1995, at 29). However, in January, 1996, a survey by New York-based Find/SVP estimated
the number of U.S. Internet users at only 9.5 million, and the number of U.S. web users at only
about 7.5 million. EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Jan. 14, 1996 (citing WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1996, at B2).
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threatens its future growth. This article analyzes the current law of
indirect copyright, trademark, and tort liability for online service
providers, and suggests a framework for analyzing vicarious liability6
in Cyberspace.

I
Vicarious Liability as an Outgrowth of the Natural Law of
Cyberspace
Although first established as a network to promote government
research, the Internet has developed into an international medium of
communication largely free from government regulation. Certain
norms of conduct-or natural law-have developed over time, the
most celebrated of which is "netiquette," which is an amorphous body
of rules of Internet etiquette.7 The growth of indirect liability litigation
involving online service providers is itself, in part, 8 an outgrowth of the
unique virtual community that is Cyberspace. 9 Cyberspace differs from
the physical world in four main respects that have legal significance.
First, in Cyberspace people can interact with relative anonymity, 10
and therefore may feel unconstrained in their conduct. For example, a
6. "Vicarious liability" is used here broadly in the tort law context of the imposition of
liability on one person for the conduct of another, based solely on a relationship between the two
people. This article addresses several theories of indirect liability, including third party tort
liability and direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright and trademark liability.
7. Netiquette has been defined as "the informal rules and customs that have developed on
the Internet ....
" Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995)(Netcom I).
8. The increase in vicarious liability litigation generally also is consistent with societal
tendencies to defer and deflect responsibility and profit from the mistakes or misdeeds of others.
For example, in one pending California lawsuit, a customer at a Kentucky Fried Chicken
restaurant sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress because, she alleged, an employee
failed to respond quickly enough in handing an armed robber all of the money in the restaurant's
cash register, causing her undue stress. Scott Graham, High Court Takes ControversialPremises
Case, RECORDER, Feb. 16, 1996, at 1.
9. Indeed, in one case, the plaintiff affirmatively argued that by custom, or netiquette,
online providers were obliged to delete infringing material from their services; when a company
failed to fulfill this obligation, the responsibility to do so was transferred upline to the next
service provider (in that particular case, from the BBS operator, which had failed to take action,
to the Internet access provider). See Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76. It is questionable whether
netiquette is yet sufficiently well defined to impose affirmative obligations on online service
providers.
10. While it is possible to send E-mail messages or post information anonymously or under
a pseudonym, complete anonymity is not always assured, especially when the tortfeasor or
intellectual property infringer communicates from an account with a commercial online service
(rather than directly over the Internet). For example, in United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568
(U.S. Air Force Crim. App. 1995), a defendant's court martial conviction was upheld based on Email messages that he sent (under a pseudonym) to another service member from his home
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physically weak or normally mild mannered person can be verbally
aggressive without fear of a direct physical response, and without the
normal social or societal cues (such as facial expressions and other
nonverbal means of communicating disapproval) that typically
moderate human behavior. Similarly, a successful thief on terra firma
must wear a mask or be accompanied by others to complete his crime
and avoid detection, whereas in Cyberspace, without the watchful eye
of a store clerk, users are less likely to think twice about "stealing"
protected software or other works by copying them. This conduct is
compounded by an online culture that finds much support for the
notion that information is free and should be freely shared."
Moreover, online anonymity also may inhibit detection.
Second, many Internet users are not "deep pockets." All
people-rich or poor, old or young, large or small-interact on equal
footing in Cyberspace. In the absence of a physical dimension, age,
size, physical, social, economic, or class limitations are not apparent in
Cyberspace. Thus, there is no social hierarchy or status online. Given
the relatively low costs of access, the Internet provides a forum for
people whose voices otherwise might not be heard. Internet

tortfeasors and infringers thus are likely to include a high percentage
of students and others who may not have the resources to satisfy large
judgments. Indeed, given the nature of Cyberspace, it is perhaps not
computer during off-duty hours via an account with America Online. In the first case of its kind,
a Caribbean dive shop owner and a scuba instructor filed suit in late 1995 in the Cook County,
Illinois Circuit Court to force America Online to reveal the name of a subscriber they claimed
had defamed them on an America Online bulletin board. EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Sept. 19, 1995
(citing ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at 8). America Online released the name after the
subscriber failed to object to the action. EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Nov. 28, 1995 (citing WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 1995, at B1). Although anonymous BBS postings may be more difficult to trace than Email, there is no assurance that an online alias may be maintained without detection. Even the
most skilled hacker ultimately can be identified and caught, as the case of Kevin Mitnick perhaps
best illustrates. Nevertheless, people's perception that they may interact anonymously, without
detection, affects their conduct, and except in the most celebrated cases, people rarely take the
time or money required to identify the source of anonymous Internet communications.
Anonymity may be easier to maintain in international communications over the Internet.
For example, in United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), the defendant was
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) with five counts of transmitting threats to injure or kidnap
another in E-mail messages transmitted over the Internet to "Gonda," an anonymous
cyberfriend in Canada. Illustrating the potential difficulties associated with applying existing laws
to Cyberspace, the court wrote that "'he' could be a ten year old girl, an eighty year old man, or a
committee in a retirement community playing the role of Gonda gathered around a computer."
Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1386. As a practical matter, the problems created by the anonymity of
Internet users abroad may be remedied by international treaty, in much the same way that the
U.S. government has addressed I.R.S. and S.E.C. enforcement abroad.
11. See, e.g., Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WItED, July, 1995, at 137 (arguing that
material over the Internet should not be protected as intellectual property).
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surprising that many of the most notorious Internet criminal
prosecutions brought by the government have involved college
students.' 2
Third, because information is so easily available online, it is much
easier for vigilant intellectual property owners and others to detect
small scale fraud in Cyberspace that, on terra firma, might go
undetected. For example, many of the reported Internet-related
intellectual property infringement cases have involved small time
bulletin board operations 13 that in size and scale are probably no
different from the record bootleggers of the 1970s or flea market
vendors of unauthorized works, except that they could be located
more easily because they were operating online, rather than in
hundreds of discrete physical locations around the country. Similarly,
defamatory words that on terra firma might be uttered in anger are
recorded without much forethought on bulletin boards or in E-mail
messages that can be saved, and copied, and more easily detected.
Fourth, international boundaries dissolve over the Internet,
creating thorny jurisdictional issues. Because Cyberspace is an
ethereal realm, online conduct actually may take place thousands of
miles from where its effects are felt, even though to users around the
world the conduct may appear to be happening directly in front of
them on their monitor screens. For example, defamatory words
exchanged in real time on a bulletin board may involve people in the
same city, across the country, or around the world.
Online infringers and tortfeasors are more likely to be effectively
"judgment proof," because their conduct is undertaken anonymously,
or they are too young or poor to satisfy a damages award, or are
located beyond the jurisdiction of a convenient and economical U.S.
venue for litigation. Consequently, as Internet use has increased and
the detection of small scale fraud has become easier, a natural
pressure has been building to impose vicarious liability on more
financially solvent defendants amenable to suit closer to homenamely online service providers.' 4
12. E.g., United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (involving an M.I.T.
student); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 502 U.S. 817 (1991) (a
Cornell graduate student); United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (a
University of Michigan student).
13. E.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (local BBS
where subscribers uploaded and downloaded bootlegged photographs); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)(BBS on which unauthorized copies of plaintiffs
copyrighted videogames were uploaded and downloaded by subscribers).
14. An online service provider may be an Internet access provider and/or a content
provider. An access provider is a company that provides subscribers with access to the Internet
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II
Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Liability in
Cyberspace
A.

Copyright Protection and Infringement

U.S. copyright law protects expression, but not underlying ideas.
Copyright protection extends to original works of authorship that are
"fixed in a tangible medium of expression."15 Data that passes over the
Internet, although ethereal, has been held to be sufficiently "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression" to be deemed protectable under the
Copyright Act. For example, software, even when not stored on a
disk,16 and interactive works, even though the sequence of action can
be altered by each individual user,17 have been held to be "fixed in a
tangible medium." Recently, and significantly for the online service
industry, Usenet newsgroup postings of copyrighted works were held
to create protectable "copies" (1) when automatically (and briefly)
stored on a BBS computer, (2) then when automatically copied to an
Internet access provider's computer, and finally (3) when
automatically copied onto other computers on the Usenet!8 Similarly,
when a user browses the Internet, the act of browsing causes a copy of
the digital information viewed on the screen temporarily to be made in
the user's computer screen memory, which has been deemed
19
protectable.

(but not necessarily content). A content provider maintains databases and potentially other
services. Netcom, for example, is an access provider. CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy,
by contrast, provide their subscribers with access to the Internet but also provide content; they
offer a wide array of services, including online conferences and discussion groups similar to
traditional BBSs, information services, and entertainment. As of late 1995, America Online, with
3.4 million customers, had the highest retention rate of the three largest online services.
EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Oct. 12, 1995 (citing INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Oct. 12, 1995, at A8).

15.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).

16. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 (1994) (turning on a computer, which causes the operating system to be
loaded from permanent storage to the computer's random access memory (RAM), was held to
constitute copyright infringement where the person turning on the computer was not licensed to
use the operating system). "[Tihe representation created in the RAM 'is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration."' MAI, 991 F.2d at 518.
17. See Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 884 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
18. See Netcom 1, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
19. See id. at 1378 n.25 (dicta).
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So long as it is original and expressive,' and fixed in tangible
form, U.S. copyright law protects each element of a multimedia work
that may be transmitted or posted in digital form over the Internet,
including traditional text, computer software, musical compositions,
photographs, pictures, drawings, other graphical displays, sound
recordings, motion pictures, and audiovisual works.21 Under U.S. law,
copyright owners are granted the exclusive rights to "reproduce,"
"distribute," transfer ownership of, rent, lease, loan, "perform,"
"display" and/or "prepare derivative works [ ] based upon the
copyrighted work."'
Copyright infringement occurs over the Internet much as it does
on terrafirma. However, it is much easier to infringe a work over the
Internet, where a huge body of protectable material may be
downloaded in digital form, combined with other materials and, in a
matter of seconds and at a cost of mere pennies, transmitted via Email to thousands of people around the world, or posted on a bulletin
board where it can be widely accessed. Given the ease with which
information can be uploaded and downloaded over the Internet, the
opportunities for infringement are significant Works may be copied
without liability, however, if the act of copying constitutes a "fair use."
B.

Fair Use and Time in Cyberspace

Fair use is a complete defense to copyright infringement.' 4 The
defense applies where a work is used "for purposes such as criticism,

20. The level of creativity required for a work to qualify for copyright protection is
extremely low. As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court, "even a slight amount will suffice."
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
22. A derivative work is a new creation based on or incorporating preexisting works. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994). For example, multimedia works that include elements of sound, text, video,
or visual images combined from many different preexisting works are "derivative works."
Copyright protection for a derivative work or compilation extends only to the material
contributed by the author to such work, and does not grant rights in the underlying preexisting
works. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). In October, 1995, bills were introduced in the House and Senate
to amend this section by adding the exclusive right of electronic "transmission" to the list of
copyright owner's right of distribution. "Transmission" would be defined as a reproduction "by
any device or process whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from
which it was sent." S. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
These bills implement one of the recommendations of the Information Infrastructure Task Force
Report of President Clinton's Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. See note 1 supra.
For an analysis of the proposed legislation by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
see Orrin G. Hatch, Digital Pirates, CONN. L. TRia., Dec. 18, 1995, at 19.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship or research."' In
considering whether the fair use defense is available, courts must
evaluate:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.26
Examples of the fair use defense include parody, in the case of a rap
song,' taping television transmissions on a videocassette recorder for
future viewing,' and, under certain circumstances, reverse engineering
of software.'
In a controversial decision, the Second Circuit held in American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.' that a scientist's practice of
photocopying individual scientific articles which he kept in personal
files in his office as a matter of convenience (to save the time it
otherwise would have taken to retrieve the articles in journals
maintained in Texaco's library) did not constitute fair use in view of
the predominantly archival (rather than research-oriented) purpose of
the copying and the harm this practice caused to the publisher's
market for licensing photocopying. The majority wrote that the
scientist's copying "served, at most, to facilitate [his] research, which
in turn might have led to the development of new products and
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994) (sampling of a
copyrighted song for use in a new parody composition).
28. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The decision was
supported by evidence that this form of copying represented "time shifting," or the practice by
viewers of recording television transmissions to watch at more convenient times. Time shifting
was not seen as detrimental to the commercial value of the copyrighted work.
29. Disassembly of copyrighted object code was held to be a fair use in Sega Enterprises
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), because (a) disassembly was necessary to
analyze those aspects of the program that were uprotectable, and (b) Accolade had a legitimate
interest in analyzing the program (to determine how to make its cartridges compatible with the
Sega Genesis console). Id. at 1520. By contrast, disassembly was held not to be a fair use in Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), although the court
noted in dicta that disassembly may be permitted when the nature of the work makes such
copying necessary to understand the unprotectable ideas and processes inherent in the program,
and the reproduction is limited in scope and does not involve commercial exploitation of the
protected aspects of the work. Id. at 842-43. For a more extensive discussion of reverse
engineering as fair use, see William S. Coats & Heather D. Rafter, The Games People Play: Sega
v. Accolade and the Right to Reverse Engineer Software, 15 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 557 (1993).
30. 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994)(Texaco 1), petition for cert.filed (Apr. 24, 1995), opinion
modified by American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995)(Texaco 11).
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technology that could have improved Texaco's commercial
performance."31 In an unusual development, the Second Circuit, in
response to the public criticism voiced about the decision, amended its
opinion in July 1995 to clarify that its ruling applied only to
"institutional, systematic" copying. 32 Judge Newman wrote that "[w]e
do not deal with the question of copying by an individual, for personal
use in research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing that under
the fair use doctrine or the de minimis doctrine, such a practice by an
individual might well not constitute an infringement."'33 Although the
Second Circuit purported to distinguish between individual and
institutional copying, the distinction is not clearly apparent from the
facts of the Texaco case itself.
The Texaco decision points out that material copied for personal
use may not be viewed as such by a court. Texaco involved a
traditional photocopy machine which the Second Circuit referred to as
technology that "threatens to disrupt the delicate balances established
by the Copyright Act."' Needless to say, in Cyberspace, where text
can be copied more quickly, thoroughly and inexpensively than on a
photocopy machine, and combined with graphics, visual images, sound
and software, the issues raised by the Second Circuit in Texaco are
more complex.
Given the speed with which information travels online, fair use
analysis in Cyberspace should account for the length of time material
is posted as part of the consideration of "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."'
Users of commercial online services typically are charged for time
spent online, not the specific content they review. Moreover, in
Cyberspace, people typically read and forward E-mail messages in a
matter of seconds, with significantly less deliberation than on terra
firma where it takes much longer to photocopy articles or manually
excise portions of a book. Because of how quickly and easily infringing
material may be posted or distributed online, service providers should
not be penalized for infringing material that remains online for
relatively brief periods of time. 6
31. Texaco 1,37 F.3d at 889.
32. Texaco 11, 60 F.3d at 931.
33. Id. at 916; see D. Pines, Aim to Narrow Circuit Ruling on 'FairUse:' Amended Decision
Issued in ControversialCase, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1995, at 1.

34.

Texaco I, 37 F.3d at 885.

35.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).

36. Instead, online service providers should be encouraged to police their domains and
delete unauthorized material. A rule of law that does not account for the brevity of an
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The Liability of Online Service Providers

Liability for copyright infringement may be direct, in the case of

an infringer, or indirect, based on contributory or vicarious liability.
Liability for direct infringement may be imposed regardless of a

defendant's intent.37 Liability for contributory infringement may be
imposed where a person or entity "with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing

conduct of another."' As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court, "the
concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the
broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to
hold one individual accountable for the actions of another."'39

Vicarious liability traditionally may be imposed where the
defendant (1) has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity, and (2) has a direct financial interest in such activities.' The
doctrine of vicarious copyright liability developed in the Second

Circuit as an outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat
superior.41 Vicarious copyright liability may be traced to two
conflicting lines of cases. The first involved landlords, who were held

not liable for the infringing acts of their tenants where they lacked
knowledge of the infringing conduct and exercised no control over the

leased premises.42 The second are the so-called "dance hall cases,"
where dance hall owners were held liable for infringing performances
because they were able to control the premises and received a direct
financial benefit from the audience which paid to enjoy the infringing

infringement would discourage companies from actively searching for and deleting infringing
content See generally Ian C. Ballon, Determining Fair Use in Cyberspace, L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 6,
1995, at 7.
37. Although a party's innocence may color the way a case is decided, culpability
technically is only relevant in determining the amount of an award of statutory damages (which
may be reduced to as little as $200 in cases of innocent infringement). 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994).
As a practical matter, this means that a defendant's alleged innocence rarely will be a significant
legal issue in a direct infringement case because a copyright plaintiff has sole discretion whether
to elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages (and intent is not considered in assessing
actual damages). See id. A defendant's bad faith, on the other hand, may be relevant in negating
a defense of fair use. See Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv.,
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244-45 (N.D. Cal. 1995)(Netcom 11).
38. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Casella
v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987)).
39. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984).
40. E.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
41. See id. at 261-62.
42. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963)
(summarizing earlier case law).
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performance.43 The doctrine has received much greater attention since
the Clinton Administration-first in its National Information
Infrastructure Green Paper in 1994 and then in the NII White Paper in
1995-took the position that, based on the dance hall cases, online
service providers could be held indirectly liable for third party
copyright infringement even where the online provider was not aware
of and did not condone the infringing conduct. By definition, vicarious
liability, like direct liability, is imposed without regard to defendant's
intent.
The first two cases involving third party liability for online
copyright infringement involved clear misconduct by the bulletin
board operators and therefore did not address issues of vicarious
liability. In Playboy Enterprises., Inc. v. Frena,4 defendant George
Frena was sued for copyright and trademark infringement based on
conduct which occurred on a subscription computer bulletin board
service (BBS) he operated. For a fee, subscribers were able to log onto
Frena's BBS and upload and download digitized copies of
photographs. Frena argued that he allowed subscribers to upload
whatever they wanted onto the BBS. However, at least 170 images
available in Frena's BBS were taken from 50 of Playboy's copyrighted
magazines, and Frena's name, the BBS name and telephone number
appeared on each of the infringing images, calling into question his
claims of innocence.4
Based on these facts, the trial court in the middle district of
Florida had little difficulty granting partial summary judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that Frena had violated Playboy's exclusive rights as
a copyright owner to distribute and display its photographs. 6 The
court rejected Frena's argument that he was unaware of the
infringement because direct liability may be imposed without regard
to intent or knowledge.47 The court's ruling, however, clearly was
colored by the defendant's own culpability for the acts of infringement
that took place on his BBS.
43. See id. (summarizing earlier case law). The Clinton Administration's Information
Infrastructure Task Force relied on the "dance hall" cases in arguing that online providers may
be held vicariously liable. NII White Paper, supra note 1, at 114 & n.355 (citing Dreamland Ball
Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,
316 F.2d 304; Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assh, Inc.,
554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); and KECA Music Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72

(W.D. Mo. 1977)).
44.
45.
46.
47.

839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
Id. at 1559.
Id.
Id.
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The following year, in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 8 a
court in the Northern District of California considered the liability of
the operators of a bulletin board called "MAPHIA" on which
unauthorized copies of plaintiff's copyrighted videogames had been
uploaded and downloaded by BBS subscribers. As in Playboy, the
defendants in Sega had not merely been passive providers of access to
a BBS. Defendants, in fact, had actively encouraged subscribers to
upload and download bootlegged copies of Sega's videogames and
even marketed hardware and software that could be used to make
unauthorized copies of the games, which in genuine form are stored on
a cartridge in a read-only memory (ROM) chip. Based on these facts,
the court granted a preliminary injunction, finding defendants liable
for copyright infringement as contributory infringers based on their
"provision of facilities, direction, knowledge and encouragement." 49
The issues of direct, contributory and vicarious liability were
directly addressed in late 1995 in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,' ° which posed the
most vexing policy questions of any case to date on how liability
should be assigned in Cyberspace. In that case, the Church of
Scientology brought suit in federal court in San Jose, California
against Dennis Erlich, a former Scientology minister who allegedly
posted works that were protected by copyright and trade secrets on a
Usenet group named "alt.religion.scientology;" Tom Klemesrud, the
operator of the BBS where Erlich posted his material; and Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Klemesrud's Internet access

provider. 5 '
48. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
49. Id. at 686-87.
50. Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
51. Id. at 1365-66. The court entered a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary
injunction against Erlich to prevent him from posting any additional materials online. See
Netcom II, 923 F. Supp. 1231. A temporary restraining order initially granted against Klemesrud,
the BBS operator, and Netcom, the Internet access provider, later was dissolved and plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction against these two providers ultimately denied. See Netcom I,
907 F. Supp. at 1383. In the same order in which he denied preliminary injunctive relief, Judge
Whyte also denied Netcom's motion for summary judgment and Klemesrud's motion for
judgment on the pleadings because he found a triable issue of fact on plaintiffs' claim for
contributory infringement. Id. at 1374, 1382. Judge Whyte found no evidence to support claims of
direct infringement against Netcom or Klemesrud or vicarious liability against Netcom, although
he granted plaintiffs thirty days' leave to amend their complaint to state a claim for vicarious
liability against defendant Klemesrud, if they could do so in good faith. Id. at 1383. Much of the
opinion focused on Netcom's liability because Netcom had brought a motion for summary
judgment, so the facts relating to Netcom were well developed. Klemesrud had brought a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, so consideration of his motion was limited to the facts alleged in
plaintiffs' complaint.
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After failing to convince defendant Erlich to stop posting
scientology documents on the "alt.religion.scientology" Usenet news
group, plaintiffs contacted Klemesrud and Netcom demanding that
they take action to stop Erlich's postings. Klemesrud responded by
asking for proof that plaintiff owned copyrights to the works posted by
Erlich, which plaintiffs refused to provide because they said his
request was unreasonable. Netcom took no action after it was notified
by plaintiffs, claiming that it could not block Erlich's postings without
shutting out all users of Klemesrud's BBS. Unlike on-line service
providers that also provide content, such as CompuServe, America
Online, or Prodigy, Netcom, as merely an Internet access provider,
does not create or control the content of the information available to
its subscribers.
The basic technological process that occurred when Erlich posted
his allegedly infringing messages to the "alt.religion.scientology"
newsgroup were not disputed by the parties:
Erlich connects to Klemesrud's BBS using a telephone and a
modem. Erlich then transmits his messages to Klemesrud's
computer, where they are automatically briefly stored. According to
a prearranged pattern established by Netcom's software, Erlich's
initial act of posting a message to the Usenet results in the automatic
copying of Erlich's message from Klemesrud's computer onto
Netcom's computer and on to other computers on the Usenet. In
order to ease transmission and for the convenience of Usenet users,
Usenet servers maintain postings from newsgroups for a short
period of time-eleven days for Netcom's system and three days for
Klemesrud's system. Once on Netcom's computers, messages are
available to Netcom's customers and Usenet neighbors, who may
then download the messages to their own computers. Netcom's local
server makes available its postings to a group of Usenet servers,
which do the same for other servers until all Usenet sites worldwide
have obtained
access to the postings, which takes a matter of
52
hours.

Judge Whyte held that Erlich's postings were sufficiently "fixed"
on Klemesrud's BBS and Netcom's computers that they constituted
protectable "copies" under the Copyright Act.53 The issues of liability,
however, were less clear.
Judge Whyte found that Netcom was not liable for direct
infringement because it had not taken any affirmative action that
directly resulted in copying plaintiffs' works other than installing and
maintaining a system whereby (pursuant to standard Internet
52. Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
53. Id. at 1368.
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protocols) software automatically forwarded messages received from
subscribers onto the Usenet and temporarily stored copies on its

system. He held that even though the Copyright Act is a strict liability
statute, "there should still be some element of volition or causation
which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to create a
copy by a third party."' In so ruling, Judge Whyte expressly
contradicted the recommendations of the NII White Paper.5' He
wrote:
The court does not find workable a theory of infringement that
would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot
reasonably be deterred. Billions of bits of data flow through the
Internet and are necessarily stored on servers throughout the
network and it is thus practically impossible to screen out infringing
bits from noninfringing bits. Because the court cannot see any
54. Id. at 1370. Netcom had compared itself to a common carrier that merely acts as a
passive conduit for information. Under the Copyright Act, passive carriers which otherwise
would be liable for secondary transmissions are deemed exempt. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
However, the court held that this statutory exemption did not apply to Netcom because it is only
available where a carrier does not have any "direct or indirect control over the content or
selection of the primary transmission." See 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1994). The court wrote that it
should be left to Congress to decide whether to create a new exemption for online service
providers, although Judge Whyte acknowledged in dicta that "[i]n a sense, a Usenet server that
forwards all messages acts like a common carrier, passively retransmitting every message that
gets sent through it." Netcom 1, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12. On balance, however, Judge Whyte
found that Netcom's conduct was closer to that of the operator of a photocopy service;
"[a]lthough some of the people using the machine may directly infringe copyrights, courts
analyz[e] the machine owner's liability under the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct
infringement." Id. at 1369.
55. The NII White Paper endorsed the notion that online service providers be subjected to
liability for third party acts of infringement because photo developers and stores that sell books,
records and computer software all are potentially subject to vicarious liability. These analogies,
however, are seriously flawed. Store operators have a much higher level of control over the
inventory they carry than Internet providers have over the bits of data that flow through their
computers. Moreover, unlike a photo developer, which operates in a darkroom, everything that
passes through an Internet provider can be viewed potentially by millions of users around the
world, creating a much higher level of potential liability than what a typical photograph
developer must bear. Notwithstanding its recommendations, the NII White Paper acknowledged
the difficulties associated with holding online service providers to standards of strict liability:
Arguments made by service providers wishing exemption or a higher standard for
liability include: that the volume of material on a service provider's system is too large
to monitor or screen; that even if a service provider is willing and able to monitor the
material on its system, it cannot always identify infringing material; that failure to
shield on-line service providers will impair communication and availability of
information; that exposure to liability for infringement will drive service providers out
of business . . . . It is estimated by some that trillions of bits representing millions of
messages and files travel through networks each day. Of course, only a percentage of
those appear on any given service provider's system. Nevertheless, it is still virtually
impossible for operators of large systems to contemporaneously review every message
transmitted or file uploaded.
NII White Paper, supra note 1, at 115-116.
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meaningful distinction (without regard to knowledge) between what
Netcom did and what every other Usenet server does, the court
56
finds that Netcom cannot be held liable for direct infringement.
The court held that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether
Netcom could be held liable for contributory infringement.' The court
found it was undisputed that Netcom did not know that Erlich was
infringing before it received notice from the plaintiffs, but there was a
question of fact about whether Netcom knew or should have known
that Erlich had infringed plaintiffs' copyrights after it received notice.
The court wrote that mere unsupported allegations of infringement by
a copyright owner may not automatically put a defendant on notice of
infringing activity, but
where works contain copyright notices within them, as here, it is
difficult to argue that a defendant did not know that the works were
copyrighted. To require proof of valid registrations would be
impractical and would perhaps take too long to verify . . . [T]he

court is more persuaded by the argument that it is beyond the ability
of a BBS operator to quickly and fairly determine when a use is not
infringement where there is at least a colorable claim of fair use.

Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack
of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's failure
to provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a likely
infringement, the operator's lack of knowledge will be found
reasonable and there will be no liability for contributory
infringement
for allowing the continued distribution of the works on
58
its system.
Judge Whyte further held that Netcom could not be held liable
for vicarious infringement because it did not receive a direct financial
benefit from Erlich's infringement. The court wrote that to prove
56. Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73. Judge Whyte implicitly, if not expressly, suggested
that in evaluating direct infringement, at least under certain circumstances, mere access
providers, such as Netcom, should be treated differently from content providers, such as the one
at issue in Playboy Enteiprises, Inc. v. Frena, which maintained a database of photographs
and therefore had some control over the material available on its service. See id. at 1370-71.
Nevertheless, Judge Whyte also found that Klemesrud could not be held accountable for direct
infringement simply because he operated the BBS on which Erlich posted infringing material. Id.
Unlike the BBS operator in Playboy, there was no allegation of causation or a volitional act
linking Klemesrud to the infringement.
57. Id. at 1375. The court also found that plaintiffs had stated a claim against Klemesrud for
contributory infringement.
58. Id. at 1374. The court wrote that Netcom might be able to show that its lack of
knowledge that Erlich was infringing was reasonable given the context of a dispute between a
former member and a church. On the other hand, Netcom could be found liable because it
admitted that it did not even look at the postings once given notice, and that had it done so and
seen plaintiffs' copyright notice on Erlich's postings, it would have undertaken an investigation.
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vicarious liability, a plaintiff must show that "the defendant (1) has the
right and ability to control the infringer's acts and (2) receive[d] a
direct financial benefit from the infringement."'59 The court found
conflicting evidence on the issue of whether Netcom had the ability to
control Erlich's infringing conduct. On the one hand, Netcom, as
merely an Internet access provider, did not create or control the
content of the information available to its subscribers, and did not
monitor messages as they were posted. On the other hand, Netcom
had in the past suspended the accounts of subscribers who had
violated its terms and conditions (for example, when individuals had
commercial software in their posted files). Additionally, some
evidence was presented that it might have been possible for Netcom to
reprogram its system to screen postings containing specific words, or
content coming from particular individuals. 6°
On the issue of whether Netcom received a direct financial
benefit from the infringement, the court found that plaintiffs could not
present any evidence to support their claim. Netcom received a fixed
fee from Klemesrud, and no evidence was presented that the
infringement by Erlich-or any other Netcom customer-enhanced
the value of Netcom's services to subscribers or attracted new
customers.61 This part of the court's decision, however, was based in
part on a lower court ruling which subsequently was reversed by the
Ninth Circuit in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.' In Fonovisa,

the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff stated a claim for vicarious
liability against the operators of a flea market where pirated records
were bought and sold, merely by alleging that defendants benefitted
financially from fixed daily rental fees paid by each infringing vendor.
In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected defendant's argument
that the financial benefit prong of the test for finding vicarious liability
could only be satisfied if the defendant earned a commission directly
tied to the sale of a particular infringing item.'
Even if the Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision in Fonovisa was
interpreted to revive plaintiff's vicarious liability claim, Netcom might
have been able to avoid liability based on the fair use defense.' In an
59. Id. at 1375 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d
Cir. 1963)).
60. Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
61. See id. at 1376-77.
62. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 263.
64. The case settled before Judge Whyte had an opportunity to consider the Ninth Circuit
ruling in Fonovisa.
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earlier ruling, Judge Whyte had rejected defendant Erlich's fair use
defense because of the high percentage of plaintiffs' works copied, the
extent of verbatim copying, and the minimal amount of added
criticism or commentary.' Judge Whyte ruled, however, that there
was a genuine question of fact as to whether Netcom (as opposed to
Erlich) had a valid fair use defense.'
In analyzing the first fair use factor-the purpose and character of
the use-the court concluded that Netcom's "use" of plaintiffs' works
was to carry out its commercial function as an Internet access
provider. The court reasoned that "Netcom's use, though commercial,
also benefits the public in allowing for the functioning of the Internet
and the dissemination of other creative works, a goal of the Copyright
Act." 67 The court also noted that, although Netcom gained financially
from its distribution of messages over the Internet, its financial
incentive was unrelated to the infringing activity. Moreover, Netcom
received no direct financial benefit from Erlich's acts of infringement.
The court determined that the second factor-the nature of the
copyrighted work-was not important to its fair use analysis because
"Netcom's use of the works was merely to facilitate their posting to
the Usenet, which is an entirely different purpose than plaintiffs' use
(or, for that matter, Erlich's use) . . ,"I In analyzing the third
factor-the amount and substantiality of the portions used-the court
deemed immaterial the extent of Netcom's copying (despite the fact
that it was substantial) because Netcom made available to the Usenet
exactly what was posted by Erlich: "Netcom copied no more of
plaintiffs' works than necessary to function as a Usenet server ...
Netcom had no practical alternative way to carry out its socially useful
purpose; a Usenet server must copy all files, since the prescreening of
postings for potential copyright infringement is not feasible."' Finally,
65. Netcom II, 923 F. Supp. at 1231. Defendant Erlich's argument that a preliminary
injunction would operate as a prior restraint on his First Amendment rights was rejected on the
grounds that the fair use defense incorporated in the 1976 Copyright Act "embodies a balance
between the rights of copyright holders, guaranteed by the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
and the protections of the First Amendment." Id. at 1258 (citations omitted). However, in a
similar lawsuit brought against another former Church of Scientology member who had posted
protected works online, Judge Kane of the District of Colorado found the copying a fair use "to

advance understanding of issues concerning the Church which are the subject of ongoing public
controversy," and in part because there was no "potential for financial loss to the Church."
Religious Technology Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1525 (D. Colo. 1995).
66. Netcom 1, 907 F. Supp. at 1381.
67. Id. at 1379.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1380 (citing Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir.

1992)).
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the court found that there was a genuine issue of fact with respect to
the fourth factor-the effect of the infringing use upon the potential
market for the protected work-which the court deemed to be the
most significant factor. 70
D. The Internet is Not a Dance Hall or Flea Market

Even though Judge Whyte's holding that Netcom was not liable
for vicarious copyright infringement was based in part on the
subsequently-reversed lower court decision in Fonovisa,71 the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in that case should not be determinative. There are
sound reasons for treating an Internet access provider differently from
the operator of a flea market or dance hall in assessing whether to
impose vicarious liability. In Cyberspace, unlike on terrafirma, time,
not specific content, often is the primary commodity being sold. 2
Except in cases of bulletin board services that specialize in infringing
material, BBS subscribers generally pay for the privilege of
exchanging opinions with others, rather than reviewing infringing
material. In addition, an Internet provider has less of an opportunity
than a record store, flea market, or dance hall to determine whether
posted material is infringing (given how quickly material is posted and
the difficulty of determining whether text posted online is protected by
copyright and, if so, whether the posting constitutes fair use). By
contrast, some flea markets are notorious for allowing vendors to sell
pirated recordings. Thus, a stronger argument could be made that
even where a fixed fee is charged, a flea market operator may benefit
from fees paid by those attending expressly to buy infringing
materials. In addition, operators can more easily patrol the physical
area where a flea market is held, and determine whether the content
sold-physical products, rather than typed words which could as easily
have been freshly composed or copiously copied-is legitimate or
infringing. The Ninth Circuit's reversal of Fonovisa therefore should
not necessarily mandate a different outcome in cases such as Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.

70.
71.
72.

Netcom 1, 907 F. Supp. at 1380.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
Online services such as CompuServe, America Online, the Microsoft Network, and

Prodigy sell content, as well as access, although even these commercial services generally charge
for time, not the particular material reviewed while online. Similarly, content providers accessible
via America Online or other commercial services are paid based on the time people spend at
their sites, rather than a per-item fee. The argument that a service directly profits from infringing
revenue is stronger when content, rather than access, is being sold, or fees are charged for the
specific content reviewed, rather than time.
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There is precedent for arguing that courts analyzing the issue of
vicarious liability in Cyberspace are not restricted to applying either
the landlord-tenant or dance hall cases described in Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co. v. H.L. Green Co.73 Although ignored in the NII White Paper
and by those who argue that the dance hall cases stand for the
proposition that Internet service providers may be held vicariously
liable for copyright infringement occurring online, other courts have
questioned whether the Shapiro test should be rigidly applied in all
contexts. For example, in Banff, Ltd. v. Limited, Inc.,' Judge Haight
of the Southern District of New York held that the two-part Shapiro
test, when applied to parent-subsidiary corporate relationships, always
would result in a finding of vicarious liability, even though such an
expansion of the Copyright Act obviously had not been intended by
Congress.75 Accordingly, Judge Haight concluded that Shapiro did not
address all cases where the issue of vicarious liability might apply. Like
the landlord-tenant relationship, Judge Haight wrote, "the parentsubsidiary relationship is not marked by a presumption
that the acts of
' 76
the one are intimately associated with the other."
Similarly, although not mentioned in the NII White Paper nor by
those who advocate the analogy between the Internet and the dance
halls of the 1920s, several cases decided subsequent to Shapiro have
looked to actual, rather than potential, control when assessing whether
to impose vicarious liability. 7 Consistent with the agency principles on
which the doctrine was based, Judge Haight concluded that in order to
impose vicarious liability, "the parties' paths must cross on a daily
basis, and the character of the intersection must be such that the party
against whom liability is sought is in a position to control the
personnel and activities responsible for the direct infringement."7 8
Cyberspace is not like a dance hall, nor is an online service like an
absentee landlord, although between these two factually dissimilar
situations, an online service probably is closer to an absentee landlord.
Like the landlord, the online service provider has potential, but not
necessarily actual, control over the hundreds, thousands or even
millions of subscribers who use its services. In evaluating vicarious
73. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
74. 869 F. Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
75. Id. at 1107-08.
76. Id. at 1109.
77. Id. at 1108-10 (summarizing other cases).
78. Id. at 1109 (citing Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and
Artists Music, Inc., v. Reed Publishing, Inc., Nos. 93 CIV. 3428 (JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
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liability in Cyberspace, courts should avoid a wooden application of
past case law and consider instead, in light of the agency principles on
which the vicarious liability doctrine was based, whether a given
defendant had actual, rather than merely potential, control over the
actions of a direct infringer.
III
Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Trademark Liability in
Cyberspace
As under copyright law, online service providers potentially may
be held contributorily or vicariously liable for trademark, service
mark, or trade dress infringement, although the grounds for imposing
indirect trademark liability are more narrow. To prevail on a claim for
trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show: (1) a protectable mark;
and (2) a likelihood of confusion. as to the origin, affiliation or
sponsorship of the defendant's product. To be protectable, a mark
must be inherently distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning.7
A mark is "inherently distinctive" if it is fanciful, arbitrary or
suggestive.80 A descriptive term, in contrast to one that is inherently
distinctive, is entitled to trademark protection only if it has acquired
secondary meaning.81 To prove secondary meaning, a plaintiff must
show an association between an alleged mark and the product in the
minds of relevant consumers. 2
Likelihood of confusion is determined by a balancing test. The
following factors are relevant:
(1) the strength of the [plaintiff's] mark; (2) [the] proximity of the
goods [or services]; (3) [the degree of] similarity of the marks; (4)
evidence of actual confusion; (5) [the] marketing channels used; (6)
[the] type of goods [or services] and the degree of care likely to be

exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting [its
own] 83mark; and (8) [the] likelihood of expansion of the product
lines.

A defendant's intent, while not determinative, is one of the factors to
be considered in assessing liability for trademark, service mark, or
trade dress infringement.

79.
80.
81.

See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291,296-97 (3d Cir. 1986).
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,768 (1992).
E.g., A.J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 297.

82. E.g., Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1987). Generic
terms are never protectable. A.J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 297.
83. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
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A. Online Trademark Infringement
Reported decisions involving trademark claims brought against
online service providers have involved obvious misconduct by the
defendants, obviating the need to consider theories of indirect liability.
In Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Frena,s4 plaintiff sued the operator of a
BBS on which its photographs had been posted for subscribers to
download. On Frena's BBS, the original text had been removed from
the plaintiffs photographs, and defendant's name, BBS name, and
telephone number had been placed on each photograph. In addition,
the trademarks "PLAYBOY" and "PLAYMATE" were used as file
descriptions for 170 of the images. 85 The defendant BBS operator
argued that the file descriptions were provided by the subscribers who
uploaded the images. Frena also argued that he was unaware of the
infringements and had allowed subscribers to upload anything they
wanted to his BBS. 6
The court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiff on its
claim for trademark infringement based on evidence that the file
descriptions on Frena's BBS infringed plaintiff's registered
trademarks. In so holding, the court simply applied the balancing test
for determining likelihood of confusion, noting that intent or bad faith
need not be shown to establish trademark infringement under 15
U.S.C. § 1141(a). 7 The court also granted partial summary judgment
for plaintiff on its unfair competition claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a),
finding that Frena's deletion of plaintiffs text from the photographs,
addition of his own text to some of the images, and appropriation of
Playboy's photographs without attribution constituted acts of unfair
competition.' In addition, by falsely inferring and describing the
origin of the photographs, Frena made it appear that Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. authorized Frena's product.' Finally, the court held
that Frena's removal of Playboy's trademarks from the photographs
constituted "reverse passing off." 9
84. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
85. Id. at 1558.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1560-61.
88. Id. at 1562.
89. Id.
90. Id. This part of the case might have been decided differently by courts in the Ninth
Circuit or the Southern District of New York, which have held that a "reverse passing off" claim
may not be maintained where an adequate remedy is available under the Copyright Act. E.g.,
Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1990); Merchant v. Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048,
1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d
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In Sega EnterprisesLtd. v. MAPHIA ,9 the defendants operated a

BBS that actively encouraged subscribers to upload and download
bootleg copies of Sega videogames. Defendants even marketed special
hardware and software to facilitate copying the games. Plaintiff's
"Sega" trademark appeared on the screen whenever a game that had
been downloaded from the MAPHIA bulletin board was subsequently
played.' In addition, some of the pirated programs posted on the
bulletin board did not function as smoothly as genuine, commercially
available Sega games, either because they were pre-release versions of
games not yet commercially available, or because glitches had been
introduced in the copying process. 93
The court entered'a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff
based in part on a finding of trademark infringement. The court
concluded that bulletin board users and/or third parties who could
receive copies from the bulletin board "are likely to confuse the
unauthorized copies downloaded and transferred from the MAPHIA
bulletin board with genuine Sega videogame programs."' The court
reasoned that "confusion, if not on the part of bulletin board users, is
inevitable on the part of third parties who may see the copied games
after they enter the stream of commerce. '"I The court also found Sega
likely to prevail on its unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act
based on its finding that the public is likely to be deceived or confused
by the similarity of marks shown on both the genuine product and the
pirated versions uploaded to the MAPHIA BBS. 6
B.

Indirect Trademark Liability

Contributory and vicarious trademark, service mark, and trade
dress liability are more narrow in scope than the equivalent copyright
theories for imposing indirect liability.' To date, there have been no
reported decisions in which an online service provider was held
indirectly liable for trademark infringement. Given the overall
1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a claim for "reverse passing off" is unavailable "within
the spheres protected by, or unintentionally left unprotected by, copyright and patent law.").
91. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
92. Id. at 684.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 688.
96. Id.
97. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984); AT&T Co.
v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1441 (3d Cir. 1994); Banff Ltd. v. Limited,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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increase in vicarious liability litigation involving online providers, it is
only a matter of time before such claims become more commonly
asserted.
Contributory trademark infringement will be found if a
defendant: (1) intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark;
or (2) continues to supply a product knowing that the recipient is using
it to engage in trademark infringement.' Stated differently, the
determination of contributory infringement depends99 upon a
defendant's intent and knowledge of the wrongful activities.
To establish vicarious liability, a defendant and the direct
infringer must have "an apparent or actual partnership, have authority
to bind one another in transactions with third parties, or exercise joint
ownership or control over the infringing product."1 ° Agency
principles underlie vicarious trademark liability, although an
independent contractor relationship may be sufficient. 1 However, the
doctrine of vicarious liability has not been universally applied, and
therefore may not be adopted in all circuits.' Moreover, where the
doctrine is applied, it must be based on agency law principles, rather
than the broader
concepts of vicarious liability applicable under tort or
103
law.
copyright
Indirect trademark liability has been imposed on manufacturers
and others involved in the distribution of infringing products, 104 and on
landlords or operators of flea markets." Given the narrow scope of
indirect liability for trademark infringement, the doctrine is likely to
be applied successfully in Cyberspace primarily where an online
service receives actual notice of an infringement and takes no action.

98. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (manufacturerdistributor); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th
Cir. 1992) (flea market operator); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th
Cir. 1996) (flea market operator).
99. David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306,311 (7th Cir. 1989).
100. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1499 (E.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd
on othergrounds, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); see also David Berg & Co., 884 F.2d at 311; Banff
Ltd., 869 F. Supp. at 1111 (quoting the lower court decision in Fonovisa without adopting the
standard).
101. See AT&T Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1435-36 (3d Cir.
1994).
102. See Banff Ltd., 869 F. Supp. at 1111.
103. See AT&T Co., 42 F.3d at 1433-34.
104. E.g., Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs, 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
105. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir.
1992); Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 264.
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IV
Tort Liability in Cyberspace
The scope of tort liability for online content providers was
defined in a series of First Amendment cases arising primarily in New
York state and federal courts, and in 1996 was modified by Congress.
The issue in tort cases brought against content providers (as opposed
to primary tortfeasors) has been whether the online content provider
is entitled to the high level of First Amendment protection afforded
news vendors and bookstores, which are liable for defamation only if
they had actual or imputed knowledge of the defamation, or of the
lower level of protection afforded to newspaper and magazine
publishers, who exercise editorial control over their publications. The
relative burdens of proof imposed on the parties can be determinative
because of the difficulty of proving actual knowledge or intent against
a company that merely provides service, and has thousands, or even
millions of customers.
A.

Online Services Treated Like a Book Store, Newsstand, or Television
Network

As with the development of copyright law in Cyberspace, the first
tort cases brought against online service providers were relatively
noncontroversial. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,'

decided in

1991, CompuServe was sued for libel, defamation, and unfair
competition based on allegedly libelous statements about plaintiffs
database, Skuttlebut, which were posted on Rumorville USA, a
publication available on CompuServe's Journalism Forum. Judge
Leisure of the Southern District of New York disposed of the case by
granting summary judgment in CompuServe's favor on all claims. The
court held that CompuServe, as the equivalent of "an electronic, for
profit library," was entitled to the same First Amendment protection
as a news vendor (and therefore would be subject to liability for
infringement only if it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly
defamatory statements), rather than a publisher, subject to a lower
standard of proof."W The court wrote that "CompuServe has no more
editorial control over such a publication than does a public library,
book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially

106.
107.

776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 140-41.
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defamatory
statements than it would be for any other distributor to do
' ' 108
SO.

The court also rejected plaintiff's attempt to hold CompuServe
liable for the acts of Don Fitzpatrick Associates ("DFA"), the
publisher of Rumorville, and CCI, an independent company that
contracted with CompuServe to "manage, review, create, delete, edit
and otherwise control the contents of [the Journalism Forum] in
accordance with editorial and technical standards and conventions of
style as established by CompuServe." 1" DFA had no employment,
contractual, or other direct relationship with CompuServe. DFA
provided Rumorville to the Journalism Forum under a contract with
CCI. The Journalism Forum's contract with DFA obligated DFA to
accept total responsibility for the contents of Rumorville.
CompuServe, in turn, had no opportunity to review Rumorville USA's
contents before it was uploaded, and received no part of any fees
charged to users for access to Rumorville. In addition, CompuServe
subscribers paid flat monthly and time usage fees, regardless of the
information services they used.
The court rejected plaintiff's contention that CCI or DFA could
be considered agents of CompuServe since each of the three entities
were independent of one another. The court characterized
CompuServe's right under its contract with CCI to remove text from
its system for noncompliance with its standards as merely a means of
maintaining "control over the results of CCI's independent work." '
Similarly, the court determined that contractual provisions calling for
CompuServe to provide CCI with training, necessary support, and to
indemnify CCI from claims resulting from information appearing in
the Journalism Forum did not give CompuServe sufficient control
over CCI and its management to render CCI an agent of CompuServe.
Finally, the court rejected the notion that CompuServe could be
vicariously liable for the actions of DFA, since DFA's contract was
with CCI.
Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corp."' was the next significant
case, decided almost four years later. In that case, controversial radio
"shock jock" Howard Stern brought suit against Delphi Internet
Services Corp. ("Delphi") for commercial misappropriation of his
name and likeness. Delphi used a picture of Mr. Stern exposing his
108.
109.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 143.

110. Id.
111. 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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buttocks to promote an online bulletin board service which Delphi had
set up for subscribers to debate the merits of Mr. Stern's 1994
candidacy for governor of New York. The court held that the
"incidental use" exception, which is grounded in the First Amendment
interest in protecting the ability of news disseminators to publicize
their own communications, shielded Delphi from liability." The court
analyzed the similarities between an online service and a news vendor
or book store, or a letters-to-the-editor column of a newspaper,
ultimately concluding that Delphi was analogous to a television
network in its dissemination of both news and entertainment.
A Wisconsin court also had occasion to rule on the nature of
13
online services in April, 1995. In It's In The Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto,
Jeff Meneau and It's In The Cards, Inc. brought suit for defamation,
negligence, and tortious interference with business relations against
Rosario Fuschetto, d/b/a Triple Play Collectibles. Meneau exchanged
communications with Fuschetto, a New York resident, over both a
bulletin board and E-mail provided on SportsNet, a national computer
network service. An argument developed between the two individuals,
which led Fuschetto to post comments about the argument on the
SportsNet bulletin board, accessible to all SportsNet subscribers.
At issue in the case was whether bulletin board postings
constituted "periodicals" within the meaning of a Wisconsin statute
providing that a plaintiff had to demand a retraction before bringing a
libel action against a "periodical.""1 4 The court held that "[p]osting a
message to the SportsNet bulletin board is a random communication
of computerized messages analogous to posting a written notice on a
public bulletin board, not a publication that appears at regular
intervals."' 5 The court wrote, however, that "[a]pplying the present
libel laws to cyberspace or computer networks entails rewriting
statutes that were written to manage physical, printed objects, not
computer networks or services. Consequently, it is for the legislature
to address the increasingly common phenomenon of libel and
defamation on the information superhighway."" 6

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 700.
535 N.W.2d 11 (Wis. 1995).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
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Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, Inc.

In Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, Inc.,117 a much more
controversial decision later that year, Judge Ain of New York's
Nassau County Supreme Court held that online service provider
Prodigy Services, Inc. was only entitled to the low level of First
Amendment protection accorded newspapers that exercise editorial
control. In that case, an anonymous Prodigy subscriber had posted
allegedly defamatory messages about the brokerage firm Stratton
Oakmont and its president on "Money Talk," a widely read financial
bulletin board where members can post statements regarding stocks,
investments, and other financial matters. Stratton Oakmont and its
president sued Prodigy for defamation.
Holding Prodigy to the standard of a "publisher" (and therefore
subject to liability for defamation regardless of actual or imputed
knowledge), Judge Ain expressly distinguished Cubby on several
grounds." 8 First, Judge Ain found that Prodigy held itself out as a
family-oriented online service that exercised editorial control over the
content of messages on its bulletin boards, thereby expressly
differentiating itself from its competitors and likening itself to a
newspaper. Second, Judge Ain found that Prodigy in fact regulated the
content on its bulletin boards by: (a) promulgating "content
guidelines;" (b) using software that automatically prescreened all
bulletin board postings for offensive language; and (c) using "Board
Leaders" to enforce Prodigy's content guidelines.119 Finally, Judge Ain
distinguished Cubby because, in that case, CompuServe had had no
opportunity to review the contents of the publication before it was
uploaded.
The court also held that for the limited purpose of monitoring and
editing "Money Talk," the Board Leader was an agent of Prodigy,
notwithstanding express language to the contrary in Prodigy's Bulletin
Board Leader Agreement. Judge Ain reached this conclusion because
Board Leaders were required to follow procedures established by
Prodigy, which exercised managerial control over the Leaders.
Prodigy filed a notice of appeal.' After Prodigy began vigorously
pursuing discovery on the defense of truth, which would have been a
complete bar to liability, a provisional settlement was reached in

117. No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995).
118. Id. at *8-11.
119. Id. at *10.
120. Cameo Clips, 10 Er. L. & FIN. 4, July, 1995, at 2.
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October, 1995. 1 As part of the terms of the settlement, Stratton
Oakmont agreed to support Prodigy's assertion that Prodigy is not a
publisher and is not liable for the acts of anonymous subscribers. On
December 13, 1995, however, Judge Ain denied Prodigy's motion to
vacate the court's May 26, 1995 opinion, even though Stratton
Oakmont supported Prodigy's motion, and the parties' settlement was
conditioned on the court vacating its prior decision. Judge Ain
reasoned that parties would be discouraged from settling cases early in
litigation if they knew that courts would, as a matter of course, vacate
unfavorable rulings when requested to do so as a condition of
settlement. In addition, Judge Ain wrote that his prior opinion dealt
with:
a developing area of law [that] has thus far not kept pace with the
technology . . . [creating] a real need for some precedents. To
simply vacate that precedent on request because these two parties
(or this plaintiff) has lost interest or decided that the litigation would
be costly or time consuming would remove the only existing New
York precedent in this area leaving the law even further behind the
technology.m
The Stratton Oakmont, case raised disturbing policy questions for
those concerned about expanding use of the Internet and online
services. Under the rule applied in that case, online services that
attempted to police their domains subjected themselves to potential
liability, while those that made no attempt to curb racist, antisocial, or
sociopathic conduct were rewarded a higher level of protection from
liability. While this result was firmly grounded in traditional First
Amendment principles, it was not well tailored to the unique demands
of online providers.
Newspapers and magazines, unlike online services, typically
publish content from various sources, including staff and freelance
authors, and have ample time to exercise editorial control over
material that appears in their publications. By contrast, online service
providers may have hundreds or even thousands of online
"publications" made available to consumers over their services which,
unlike traditional publications, rely to a large extent on direct input
121. Michelle Quinn, Online Libel Suit Dropped, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1995, at B1. For
further discussion of this case, see Barbara W. Wall & Kimberly Currow, Libel in Cyberspace,
COMPUTER LITIG. J., Vol. IV, No. 4 (A.B.A. Jan. 1, 1996).

122. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Serv., Inc., No. 31063194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1995). In
an interesting twist, which shows how dramatically the Internet has changed the way we as a
society do business (and by extension, the way we practice law), Judge Ain's decision, which has
been the subject of numerous articles and critiques, is not "published" in traditional legal
reporters; it is only available online.
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from the public. A large service provider like Prodigy could hardly be
expected to police all of the bulletin boards available on its service, let
alone exert the same level of editorial control that editors of a single,
discrete publication may be able to exercise. Moreover, an online
service like Prodigy, over which millions of individuals read and post
messages each year, could not possibly maintain the same degree of
control as a newspaper or magazine that typically includes only a few
carefully screened and edited letters in a small section devoted to
reader comments. More fundamentally, time constraints make it
impractical for online services to screen messages with the same level
of care and editorial control as a weekly magazine, or even a daily
newspaper. Many online services include bulletin boards or chat
rooms where conversations take place in real time. While it may be
possible to install software that automatically blocks out certain words
deemed offensive, a substantive review of postings would not be
practical unless the service dramatically slowed down posting time,
which would destroy the appeal of the genre (which depends on
immediate, real time contact, to simulate live conversations), or hire
an army of people to review messages, which would so drastically
increase the cost of subscription fees that this solution would also
destroy the medium. Further, it is not possible to edit thousands of
threads of anonymous conversations with any degree of confidence
that the context of the message-and by extension any potentially
defamatory statement-would be understood. Ultimately, online chat
rooms and bulletin boards more closely resemble conversations in a
town square or on a large party line, than rigorously edited articles in a
print magazine.
C.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996

Congress recognized that decisions like Stratton Oakmont
discourage companies from operating online, or even putting content
on Web pages, for fear of being held vicariously liable for the
misdeeds of those who use the services they provide. In response,
Congress expressly overruled the Stratton Oakmont decision in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Section 509 of the Act provides that
"[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider."' The Act further provides
that:
123. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (West 1996). An "interactive
computer service" is defined under the Act as "any information service, system, or access
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1).2 4

The Act expressly preempts inconsistent state laws, but does not
prevent states from enforcing laws consistent with the purpose of the
The legislative history of the section states that it is
Section.'
intended to overrule Stratton Oakmont and any other similar decisions
which have treated online "providers and users as publishers and
speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted
access to objectionable material." 1"
By reversing Stratton Oakmont, the Telecommunications Act

does not insulate online service providers from all liability for online
defamation. However, it guarantees online services the same First
Amendment protections available to news vendors and bookstores,
such that online providers will be liable for defamation only when they
have actual or imputed knowledge of the defamation and fail to act. In
this regard, the standard for imposing indirect tort liability in
Cyberspace is, by statute, very close to the test for imposing
contributory liability for copyright infringement.
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
... 47
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet.
U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(2). An "access software provider" is defined as "a provider of software . . .
or enabling tools that do any of the following: (A) filter, screen, allow or disallow content; (B)
pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or (C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search,
subset, organize, or translate content." 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(4). An "information content
provider" is defined as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service." 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(3).
124. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(2).
125. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(d)(3). As expressed in terms of stated policy, the purpose of the
section is to promote the development of the Internet and other interactive computer services
and media, to preserve the free market for the Internet and online services without state or
federal government regulation, to encourage the development of technologies that maximize
user control over what information is received by users, to remove disincentives for the
development and use of blocking and filtering technologies that parents may use to restrict
children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material, and to ensure the
enforcement of federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b).
126. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, 104 Cong., 2nd Sess. at 194 (1996).
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While the Telecommunications Act goes a long way towards
restoring a sensible balance between the interests of online providers
and those injured in Cyberspace, it has no effect on the doctrines of
vicarious copyright and trademark liability. In fact, the Act expressly
provides that the section reversing Stratton Oakmont should not be
construed as limiting or expanding any intellectual property laws. 12

V
Defining New Rules in Cyberspace
Congress sensibly recognized the problems posed by vicarious
tort liability and reversed Stratton Oakmont. Internet access and
content providers no longer may be held to the standard of a
newspaper publisher, and liable for defamatory statements-or rather
bits of data-that pass through their systems, regardless of their
knowledge or intent. The same policy justifications for holding online
services liable only when they have actual or imputed knowledge of an
online tort apply with equal measure to online acts of copyright and
trademark infringement. Online services are no better able to police
their domains for reams of text-or bits of data-that may be
infringing, than they are bits of data that may be defamatory.
Although Congress has, for the moment, not amended the
copyright and trademark statutes to limit the scope of third party
liability for online acts of infringement, there are sound reasons for
judges, in most circumstances, to narrowly apply indirect liability
doctrines in Cyberspace. Vicarious liability is based on principles of
agency, yet online service providers are neither agents nor principals
of those who use their services. Since Cyberspace is different from the
physical world, it would be a mistake to blindly apply cases involving
dance hall owners from the big band era, vendors of bootleg records
from the early 1960s, or contemporary flea market operators, to
companies whose domains are vastly larger and more difficult to
monitor. In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online
Communication Services, Inc.,' Judge Whyte sensibly suggested some
of the parameters that should be considered when attempting to hold
online providers liable for the acts of infringement of their subscribers
(or unrelated third parties whose data, as a result of Internet

127. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(d)(2). For further discussion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
see Ian C. Ballon, A Prodigious Decision: Stratton Oakmont and the Telecommunications Act of
1996, CYBERSPACE LAWYER, May, 1996, at 10.
128. Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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protocols, may automatically pass through a potential defendant's
system).
Because so much of what happens online is automatic-based on
operating software and established protocols-direct copyright and
trademark liability should not be imposed on an access or content
provider unless there is some element of volition or causation present.
This showing will be easier to make in the case of a small BBS or Web
site owner, who presumably is better able to police its domain, than
one of the large commercial online service providers such as
CompuServe, America Online or Prodigy, which support hundreds of
content providers and have millions of subscribers, or a mere access
provider, whose role in any alleged infringement typically would
merely be incidental. Of course, when a defendant operates a BBS
such as the one in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,1 courts should
have little difficulty finding the service provider liable for direct
infringement.
When Internet service providers have actual or imputed
knowledge and fail to act, they can be held liable in tort or for
contributory copyright or trademark infringement. In evaluating the
conduct of an online service, however, it is important to consider
whether it had adequate information on which to act. Where a
defendant is told of infringing material that contains copyright or
trademark notices, it should be held to a higher standard than when
the information potentially is indistinguishable from noninfringing
material. The burden also should fall on the copyright or trademark
owner, or person allegedly defamed, to provide adequate, specific
information on which the service provider can act. Rigid rules of
conduct, however, are ill advised, especially when decisions such as
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.13 make it difficult to
evaluate what constitutes fair use within a single company, let alone in
Cyberspace. Under current tort law, and as suggested for evaluating
contributory copyright infringement claims by Judge Whyte in
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online Communication
Services, Inc.,131 the adequacy of notice provided by an aggrieved
plaintiff, and/or the adequacy of an online services response to notice
of an online defamation or infringement should be judged by a
reasonableness standard.

129. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
130. Texaco II, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995); see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
131. Netcom I, 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73
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For the same policy reasons recognized by Congress in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, online service providers should be
actively encouraged to police their domains to eliminate infringing
material. Unfortunately, under current theories of vicarious liability,
online providers are penalized for taking affirmative steps to prevent
third party infringement. Online providers that act to eliminate
infringement may be held to a higher standard than those who do not.
For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online
Communication Services, Inc., the court found a genuine issue of fact
existed on the issue of whether Netcom had the right and ability to
control the conduct of defendant Erlich, a direct infringer, precisely
because it had reserved the right in its service contracts to cancel the
accounts of subscribers who committed acts of online infringement,
and had in the past closed a number accounts when it learned that
subscribers were committing online infringements.' The fact that a
company like Netcom may be able to detect and remedy some acts of
infringement does not mean that it should be penalized, and held to a
higher standard, for those acts of infringement which it did not detect.
Policing the ethereal world of the Internet is different from verifying
the physical contents sold in a record shop or at a flea market or the
songs played in a dance hall. Courts need to recognize this difference
and not merely apply rote rules (without regard to the underlying
policies) established in cases that arose in very different contexts.
The "financial benefit" prong of the test for assessing vicarious
copyright liability also should be applied differently to online
providers than it has been in more traditional cases, including the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Fonovisa.13 In particular, in evaluating
whether an online service received a financial benefit from a third
party's infringement, courts generally should look at the amount of
time the work was available online, at least in those cases where
subscribers pay for time, rather than specific content (and absent
evidence that the online provider benefitted from a reputation for
tolerating infringement).
One mitigating factor in applying vicarious copyright liability to
online providers is the fair use doctrine, which may not be applicable
in dance hall, record store, or flea market cases, but should have broad
application online, at least for mere access providers. Under Judge
Whyte's analysis in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online

132. Id. at 1374.
133. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Communication Services, Inc.,' the purpose and character of use
factor should generally weigh in favor of an online access provider,
and the second and third factors, the nature of the copyrighted work
and the amount and substantiality of the portions copied, will be
irrelevant in cases where an access provider merely served to facilitate
communications over the Internet (as opposed to providing a service
geared around specific content). As in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom Online Communication Services, Inc., the fair use analysis for
most access providers should turn on the fourth factor, the effect of
the use on the market for the copyrighted work. In analyzing this
factor for online providers, however, courts should consider the
amount of time a work was available online, which should be
determinative in some cases.
A careful analysis of the copyright and trademark liability of
online providers should result in providers being held vicariously
liable only where a clear relationship exists between it and the party
directly liable for the infringement. Although content providers and
access providers may appropriately be held to different standards of
conduct under different circumstances, as a general rule, except in
those rare cases where vicarious liability should be found because an
online provider has turned a blind eye to (and profited from) acts of
infringement, online service providers should only be held liable
where there is evidence of contributory infringement or some element
of volitional conduct or causation.
VI
Vicarious Liability as an Impediment to the International
Development of the Internet
Although there is precedent for applying vicarious liability
narrowly to online service providers, by requiring a showing of actual,
rather than potential control over the conduct of the direct infringer,'
there have been few reported cases arising in Cyberspace. The NII
White Paper, which endorses the applicability of the dance hall cases
to Cyberspace, provides cause for concern about the potential
exposure of online providers for conduct they cannot control, and
creates uncertainty which could serve as a barrier to entry for new
companies. The current uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent
of online liability is also important to resolve because the Internet is
134.

See Netcom 1,907 F. Supp. at 1372-73.

135.

See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
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accessible throughout the world. The international character of the
Internet makes it at the same time difficult for courts and governments
to fully enforce local laws, and online access and content providers to
comply with local laws except by implementing changes
internationally.
On the one hand, local laws dealing with the dissemination of
information are difficult to fully enforce because of widespread access
to the Internet. For example, an Ontario judge ordered a news
blackout on coverage of the Homulka murder trial, which, consistent
with Canadian law, resulted in Wired magazine's April 1994 issue
being censored in Canada. In response, Wired magazine posted a press
release at its Internet site, listing Internet addresses where the
censored articles and other information on the trial could be obtained
by Canadian residents."3
On the other hand, local judicial, legislative, and administrative
law enforcement affecting access to, or content available over, the
Internet can have a profound impact internationally. For example, in
late 1995, CompuServe announced, in response to a claim from federal
prosecutors in Germany that the pornographic content of certain
Internet newsgroups violated German law, that CompuServe would
block its subscribers from accessing as many as 250 Internet
newsgroups from its worldwide network because it could not block
access solely to its German subscribers.' Subsequently, the
prosecutor's office in Mannheim, Germany launched an investigation
of CompuServe and Deutsche Telekom's T-Online service for inciting
racial hatred because these online services, as Internet providers,
allow Germans to access a Web site run by a neo-Nazi extremist in
18
Canada who uses the Internet to distribute anti-Semitic propaganda. 1
Local attempts to reach entities in other countries can have a
detrimental effect on the development of the Internet by discouraging
companies from operating online and exposing themselves to liability
abroad, and discouraging online content and access providers from
expanding into countries that impose heavy-handed regulations.
Because the application of U.S. law to the Internet has international
ramifications, it is important to the extent possible to clarify our
136. See Press Release, Cyberspace Cannot Be Censored, HOT WIRED ONLINE SERVICE (Mar.
23, 1994) <http://www.hotwired.com>.
137. CompuServe Blocks Access to Some Internet Porn, DAILY REC., Dec. 29, 1995, at 1.
138. EDUPAGE, supra note 3, Jan. 28, 1996 (citing WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1996, at B2). For a
discussion of the policy implications of international censorship and jurisdictional issues, see
Kent Stuckey, "Risk and Reward "--Legal Land Mines and Marketing Gold Mines in New Media,
Bus. L. TODAY, March, 1996.
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domestic laws relating to Internet liability, and seek, where possible,
international cooperation to harmonize laws and policies. For
example, it would be appropriate to address by international treaty
jurisdictional issues relating to the Internet, much in the same way that
S.E.C. and I.R.S. enforcement abroad is facilitated through
international treaties. In addition, U.S. laws affecting third party
liability for online conduct should be harmonized, and made consistent
with international standards, where liability for contributory
recognized, but not vicarious copyright and
infringement is potentially
139
liability.
trademark
VII
Conclusion
The significant increase in vicarious liability litigation to remedy
Internet torts and infringements is a logical outgrowth of the
Cyberspace environment, where those directly responsible for online
misconduct are difficult to locate, beyond effective jurisdiction, or
unable to satisfy potential judgments. At the same time, a legal regime
that imposes potentially limitless liability on companies simply for
providing access to the Internet risks truncating the continued
development and future growth of Cyberspace. The present confusion
surrounding the extent of potential third party liability is generating
new litigation from which clear, narrow rules governing third party
liability should develop if courts closely analyze the nature of online
conduct, rather than rigidly apply old case law decided in factually
dissimilar contexts.
VIII
The
Netcom Settlement
Post-script:
Six months after this article was written, in August, 1996, Netcom
reached an agreement with the Church of Scientology to settle the
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc. case. In connection with the settlement, Netcom adopted
specific guidelines for responding to complaints about acts of online
copyright or trademark infringement, entitled "Intellectual Property

139. See, e.g., Final Report of the (Canadian) Information Highway Advisory Council,
<http://www.emp.ca/opengov/nabst>. The Report states that, although BBS owners and
operators are not common carriers, "a defense mechanism should be provided for those instances

where it can be demonstrated that they did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the
infringing or offensive material and where they have acted reasonably to limit potential abuses."
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Rights on the Internet" (the "Netcom Guidelines").' The Netcom
Guidelines do not expressly respond to many of the questions left
unanswered by Judge Whyte about how an online provider may
evaluate whether material posted online in fact is infringing. 4 ' The
Guidelines do, however, provide a framework for Netcom to respond
to third party complaints and, although obviously drafted to limit
Netcom's liability for contributory copyright infringement, may prove
influential in encouraging online providers to adopt guidelines
generally applicable to complaints about a wide range of online
misconduct.
The Netcom Guidelines prohibit subscribers from "using Netcom
services to unlawfully distribute the intellectual property of others"
and provide a mechanism for owners of intellectual property who
believe their rights have been "improperly posted or distributed via
Netcom servers . . . to contact Netcom" so that appropriate action
may be taken. The procedures for challenging postings are as follows:
1. The complainant shall provide Netcom and the posting party with
notice of the alleged violation with enough specific detail to allow
Netcom to locate the posting. The complainant shall ask the posting
party to remove the material, pending Netcom's investigation.
2. Complainant shall substantiate its claim by providing Netcom
with:
a. The copyright or trademark registration number;
b. A copy of the underlying work; and
c. A good faith certification, signed under penalty of perjury,
the original work is the property of complainant, that a
significant portion of that work has been copied, and that the
use of the work is not defensible.
3. Upon receipt of notice from the complaining party, the posting
party may provide Netcom with a response to the complaint.
4. Upon receipt of the information received in item 2 above, Netcom
will initiate an investigation. While Netcom is investigating the
complaint, Netcom will temporarily remove or deny access to the
challenged material, to protect the rights of all involved.
5. If Netcom concludes that complainant has raised a legitimate
claim, it will continue to deny access to the challenged material. If
Netcom concludes that complainant has not raised a legitimate
claim, Netcom will restore access to the challenged material.' 42

140. Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet, August 1, 1996
<http://www.netcom.com/about/protectcopy.html> [hereinafter Netcom Guidlines].
141. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text, and Section V.
142. Netcom Guidelines, supra note 140.

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT

L.J.

[Vol. 18:729

Although specifically focused on acts of online copyright and
trademark infringement, the Netcom Guidelines are broadly
consistent with other areas of law in which liability is imposed on
online providers only where they have actual knowledge of or have
condoned third party conduct. For example, under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, ISPs cannot be held indirectly liable
for defamation if the offending material is posted online without their
knowledge or consent.'
Similarly, under the Communications
Decency Act, online providers can only be held liable for knowing
conduct when child pornography or obsence material is posted online
by third parties." The Netcom Guidelines, therefore, may be
generally influential in providing guidance on how online providers
should respond to notice of online misconduct.
Since liability for online contributory copyright infringementlike defamation and violations of the Communications Decency Actmust be based on knowledge and the ISP's failure to act, parties
injured by third party misconduct often will need to place an online
provider on notice before it may be held indirectly liable (if it fails to
take action, after receiving a demand letter, to eliminate the offending
material).145 Once notice is provided, the exact parameters of a
provider's legal obligation are unclear.
In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc., Judge Whyte suggested that an
unsupported allegation of infringement may not automatically place a
provider on notice of infringing activity for purposes of imposing
liability for contributory copyright infringement. The Netcom
Guidelines do not elaborate on how Netcom will evaluate or respond
to particular disputes. For example, paragraph 5 of the guidelines does
not delineate when a claim will be deemed "legitimate." This lack of
specificity may limit Netcom's potential liability for failing to faithfully
implement its new policy,"4 and give Netcom flexibility in responding
to third party complaints, but ultimately leaves it to courts-or

143. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(2) (West 1996).
144. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(1).
145. Notwithstanding the Netcom Guidelines, an online provider theoretically could still be
subject to vicarious copyright liability. See supra notes 15-69 and accompanying text.
146. By contrast, when Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") adopted very specific guidelines for
resolving disputes over Internet domain names, it was sued multiple times by parties who alleged
that it had failed to properly implement its policies. See, e.g., Ian C. Ballon, dispute.com: The Next
Generation of Domain Name Litigation, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Summer, 1996, at 7. NSI's
experience undoubtedly influenced Netcom in adopting more general guidelines.
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industry custom-to determine the type of response deemed
reasonable.
By sending a demand letter to an online service, a potential
plaintiff effectively shifts the burden to the provider to either remove
the offending material or risk liability. Providers therefore have an
incentive to err on the side of the complainant, and remove material
even in cases where the posting party's liability is unclear. Not
surprisingly, the Netcom Guidelines therefore generally favor
complainants by providing that Netcom will immediately remove
questionable material pending an investigation.14 7 In appropriate
circumstances an ISP also may want to close the account of a
subscriber accused of posting infringing material online.
Whatever the provider's response to a demand letter, timeliness is
important. By the time infringing text, software, sound, or video have
been online for a period of days or weeks, the infringing material may
have been copied and circulated widely over the Internet. While it
may not be fair to hold an online provider liable for the passage of
time, companies need to respond quickly to complaints to avoid being
held liable as contributory infringers. Likewise, complainants need to
move swiftly if they hope to have infringing materials effectively
removed.11
The Netcom Guidelines favor owners of registeredcopyrights and
trademarks, even though copyright and trademark protection exist
independently of registration. 4 9 The Netcom Guidelines do not
suggest how Netcom will respond to complaints from owners of
unregistered copyrights and common law trademarks. It also is unclear
how Netcom will treat foreign works, since copyright registration is
not even possible in many countries, and (except where rights are
extended by treaty) both copyright and trademark protection is
territorial by nature, even though the Internet is global in its reach.
While it is understandable that Netcom would demand proof of
registration-since it is otherwise more difficult for an online provider
to evaluate the merits of a potential claim-if providers ignore
legitimate complaints from owners of common law trademarks and
147. On the other hand, this policy could encourage fraudulent claims, and be potentially
detrimental to target companies. Even if perhaps unfair to certain parties in application, the
provision is rational for Netcom given current standards for imposing contributory copyright
liability.
148. See generally Ian C. Ballon, Third Party Copyright Liability in Cyberspace: The Netcom
Settlement & Policy Statement, CYBERSPACE LAWYER, Nov., 1996.

149. In this regard, the Netcom Guidelines resemble NSI's Domain Dispute Policy
Statement, which also favors owners of registeredtrademarks. See id.
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unregistered copyrights they may expose themselves to liability, at
least at this time.
In the future, legal precedent, or industry standards, may make it
reasonable for an online provider to demand proof of a registered
copyright or trademark before taking action, given the difficulties
otherwise associated with evaluating competing ownership claims in
the short time period within which a provider must determine whether
to remove material posted online. It may even be the case that the
Netcom Guidelines help establish that industry standard. Today,
however, an ISP's insistence on receiving proof of ownership of a
registered copyright or trademark may not insulate a provider from
contributory liability, at least where a complainant is able to provide
strong evidence of ownership and infringement.
Although the Netcom Guidelines are directed at minimizing
Netcom's potential liability for contributory copyright infringement,
they may also limit its potential vicarious liability. A court could find
that policies such as the Netcom Guidelines, if publicized, discourage
potential infringers from subscribing to a particular Internet service.
The online provider, therefore, could more effectively argue that it did
not profit from any acts of infringement. In addition, because Netcom
has stated that it will immediately remove any challenged material, it
may be in a stronger position to argue that any claim for potential
vicarious liability should be dismissed under the de minimis doctrine
(assuming that any infringing material in fact is removed after having
been online for only a very brief period of time).

